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Abstract
This paper offers a critique of the Bayesian interpretation of quantum
mechanics with particular focus on a paper by Caves, Fuchs, and Schack
containing a critique of the “objective preparations view” or OPV. It also
aims to carry the discussion beyond the hardened positions of Bayesians
and proponents of the OPV. Several claims made by Caves et al. are
rebutted, including the claim that different pure states may legitimately
be assigned to the same system at the same time, and the claim that the
quantum nature of a preparation device cannot legitimately be ignored.
Both Bayesians and proponents of the OPV regard the time dependence
of a quantum state as the continuous dependence on time of an evolving
state of some kind. This leads to a false dilemma: quantum states are
either objective states of nature or subjective states of belief. In reality
they are neither. The present paper views the aforesaid dependence as a
dependence on the time of the measurement to whose possible outcomes
the quantum state serves to assign probabilities. This makes it possi-
ble to recognize the full implications of the only testable feature of the
theory, viz., the probabilities it assigns to measurement outcomes. Most
important among these are the objective fuzziness of all relative positions
and momenta and the consequent incomplete spatiotemporal differentia-
tion of the physical world. The latter makes it possible to draw a clear
distinction between the macroscopic and the microscopic. This in turn
makes it possible to understand the special status of measurements in all
standard formulations of the theory. Whereas Bayesians have written con-
temptuously about the “folly” of conjoining “objective” to “probability,”
there are various reasons why quantum-mechanical probabilities can be
considered objective, not least the fact that they are needed to quantify
an objective fuzziness. But this cannot be appreciated without giving
thought to the makeup of the world, which Bayesians refuse to do. Do-
ing this on the basis of how quantum mechanics assigns probabilities, one
finds that what constitutes the macroworld is a single Ultimate Reality,
about which we know nothing, except that it manifests the macroworld
or manifests itself as the macroworld. The so-called microworld is neither
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a world nor a part of any world but instead is instrumental in the man-
ifestation of the macroworld. Quantum mechanics affords us a glimpse
“behind” the manifested world, at stages in the process of manifestation,
but it does not allow us to describe what lies “behind” the manifested
world except in terms of the finished product—the manifested world, for
without the manifested world there is nothing in whose terms we could
describe its manifestation.
1 Introduction
The present paper has two objectives. Fuchs [1] and Caves, Fuchs, and Schack [2,
3] have presented a case for a Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanics.
My first objective is to offer a critique of the Bayesian interpretation with par-
ticular focus on the authors’ recent paper [4] (“CFS” in what follows). CFS
contrast their subjective stance on both quantum uncertainty and certainty
with what they call the “objective-preparations view” (OPV). According to
the latter, a system’s quantum state is determined by a sufficiently detailed,
agent-independent classical description of a preparation device, this being it-
self an agent-independent physical system. My second objective is to carry the
discussion beyond these hardened opposing positions.
The first section states what is not at issue. Points of divergence are spelled
out in Sec. 3, the key issue being the nature of the time dependence of quantum
states. CFS share with the proponents of the OPV the cognate notions that
quantum states evolve and that quantum-mechanical probabilities are absolute.
Here the case is made that quantum-mechanical probabilities are conditional
rather than absolute, and that the time dependence of a quantum state is the
dependence of an algorithm, which serves to assign probabilities to the possible
outcomes of a measurement, on the time of the measurement.
CFS go so far as to assert that for sufficiently divergent prior beliefs, “two
agents might even legitimately assign different pure states.” This brings up the
question, considered in Sec. 4, of how much state assignments can legitimately
differ. A further claim made by CFS is that proponents of the OPV ignore the
essential quantum nature of preparation devices (and that it is wrong to do so).
They illustrate this claim with the help of a quantum circuit containing qbits
and c-not gates. The holes in their argument are pointed out in Sec. 5, and in
Sec. 6 it is argued that a device is a legitimate preparation device if and only if
its quantum-mechanical nature is irrelevant to its functioning as a preparation
device.
The present paper’s constructive part begins with Sec. 7. While quantum
Bayesians keep the notorious measurement problem safely locked away in “a
single black-boxed piece of hardware: the 1-Qbit measurement gate” [5], most
others believe that “to solve this problem means to design an interpretation
in which measurement processes are not different in principle from ordinary
physical interactions,” as an anonymous referee once put it to me.1 The way
1Since quantum mechanics describes interactions in terms of correlations between the prob-
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I see it, to solve this problem means to design an interpretation in which the
central role played by measurements in standard axiomatization of quantum
mechanics is recognized and explained. If this were easy, it would have been
done long ago. As was pointed out by Dieks [6], the difficulty is that
the outcome of foundational work in the last couple of decades has
been that interpretations which try to accommodate classical intu-
itions are impossible, on the grounds that theories that incorporate
such intuitions necessarily lead to empirical predictions which are at
variance with the quantum mechanical predictions. However, this is
a negative result that only provides us with a starting-point for what
really has to be done: something conceptually new has to be found,
different from what we are familiar with. It is clear that this con-
structive task is a particularly difficult one, in which huge barriers
(partly of a psychological nature) have to be overcome.
I believe that in attempting this constructive task, the following points, which
are outlined in Sec. 7, must be borne in mind [7, 8, 9, 10]:
• The intrinsically and completely differentiated arena of physical events
called “spacetime” is a figment of our mathematical imagination.
• Spacetime coordinates only exist as features of the quantum-mechanical
correlation laws. While not objective per se, they are (to a limited extent)
capable of being objectified or becoming objective via outcome-indicating
events or states of affairs—the only points of contact that exist between
the correlation laws and the physical world.2
• The spatiotemporal aspects of the physical world consist of the more or
less fuzzy relative positions and relative times that exist between physical
objects, physical events, or physical states of affairs.
• These relative positions and relative times exist to the extent that they
are indicated by, or can be inferred from, physical objects, physical events,
or physical states of affairs.
• The spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world is incomplete.
Outcome-indicating events and states of affairs occur or obtain in the macro-
world. What counts as “macroscopic” is rigorously defined (without going
beyond the conceptual tools of standard quantum mechanics) in Sec. 8. This
abilities of the possible outcomes of measurements performed on the interacting systems, I
wonder what the referee could have meant by an “ordinary physical interaction.”
2A measurement is an event or state of affairs from which something can be inferred
about something else. (Attempted but unsuccessful measurements are not included in this
definition.) Do we also need to define events and states of affairs? Obviously not. For one
thing, we know them when we see them. For another, because quantum mechanics presupposes
their existence or occurrence, it cannot account for it, anymore than we can explain why there
is anything, rather than nothing at all.
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definition, which strongly relies on the incompleteness of the world’s spatiotem-
poral differentiation, makes it legitimate to attribute to the macroworld a reality
independent of anything external to it.
How does one define and quantify a fuzzy observable? The answer, spelled
out in Sec. 9, is: by assigning probabilities to the possible outcomes of a measure-
ment of the same. This is also the reason why the probabilities of measurement
outcomes play a central role in standard axiomatization of the theory. And
why are observables such as relative positions and relative momenta fuzzy? The
answer to this question is that the fuzziness of those observables is required for
the stability of matter. This answer disposes of arguments by CFS to the effect
that if quantum uncertainty is subjective, then so is certainty. On the contrary,
quantum uncertainty—a bad translation of Heisenberg’s term Unscha¨re, the lit-
eral meaning of which is “fuzziness”—can be as objective as certainty. After all,
the stability of a material object hinges on the objective fuzziness of its inter-
nal relative positions and momenta, rather than on our subjective uncertainty
about the values of these observables.
In Sec. 10 several good reasons are given why quantum-mechanical proba-
bilities may be considered objective. In addition, an argument by Fuchs and
Schack [35], designed to illustrate “the folly of trying to have two kinds of prob-
abilities in quantum mechanics” (one subjective and one objective), is refuted.
Perhaps the most disconcerting aspect of quantum mechanics—which only
comes to light if, instead of trying to explain it away, one tries to make sense
of the central role played by measurements—is the supervenience of the mi-
croscopic on the macroscopic. A set of properties A supervenes on a set of
properties B if and only if any two objects which share all properties in B
must also share all properties in A. The properties of the microworld depend
in just this way on the properties of the macroworld. Hence we cannot think
of particles, atoms, and such as constituents of the macroworld. Then what
constitutes the macroworld? This question is addressed in Sec. 11. The conclu-
sion reached is that the number of “ultimate constituents of matter” is exactly
one. This conclusion is supported by a time-honored ontology: ultimately there
exists a One Being, and the macroworld is its manifestation. The so-called
“microworld” is therefore neither a world nor a part of any world. Rather, it
is instrumental in the manifestation of the macroworld. Quantum mechanics
affords us a glimpse “behind” the manifested world at formless particles, non-
visualizable atoms, and partly visualizable molecules which, instead of being
the world’s constituent parts or structures, are instrumental in its manifesta-
tion. But—and this is why the microscopic supervenes on the macroscopic—we
cannot describe what lies “behind” the manifested world except in terms of the
finished product—the manifested world.
Section 12, finally, spells out the reason why the manifestation of the world
cannot be described except in terms of the manifested world. It is simply that
without the manifested world there is nothing in whose terms we could describe
its manifestation. Section 13 summarizes and concludes.
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2 Points of agreement
Before embarking on the critical part of this paper, I wish to point out what is
not at issue. I agree with CFS that
(1) there are no preassigned values to, and no instruction sets behind, quan-
tum measurement outcomes; this includes outcomes that are certain;
(2) differently put, there is nothing intrinsic to a quantum system—no ele-
ment of reality, no independently possessed property—that guarantees a
particular measurement outcome;
(3) there is no local and realistic explanation for the correlations predicted by
quantum mechanics;
(4) state assignments, including pure-state ones, have no objective status;
(5) the role of physical law in a quantum mechanical world is to relate prob-
abilities, not to determine them;
(6) the Bayesian interpretation of probability is superior to both the frequen-
tist and the potentiality/propensity interpretations.3
3 Points of divergence
A quantum state ρ(t) is an algorithm that serves to assign probabilities to
the possible outcomes of any measurement that may be made at the time t.
In keeping with this commonplace, I take the view that the time dependence
of ρ(t) is a dependence on the time of a measurement—the measurement to
whose possible outcomes ρ serves to assign probabilities. It is not the time
dependence of an evolving state of any kind. This disposes of the question
whether a quantum state has two modes of evolution or only one; it has none.4
What is at issue here is not (at any rate, not primarily) the role of prob-
ability in quantum mechanics but the principle of evolution. By this I mean
the notion that physics can be divided into a kinematical part, which concerns
the description of a system at an instant of time, and a dynamical part, which
concerns the evolution of a system from earlier to later times. While relativity
made it seem as if the principle of local action was a consequence of the principle
of evolution, quantum mechanics appears to rule out not only local realistic in-
terpretations of the predicted and observed correlations between measurements
3Relative frequencies, belonging as they do to the domain of facts or events, are different
from probabilities, and the interpretation of probabilities as potentialities [11, 12] or propen-
sities [13, 14, 15, 16] contravenes the conditional (as against absolute) nature of quantum-
mechanical probabilities pointed out in the next section.
4To forestall a possible objection: if the Hamiltonian depends on time, it includes effects
of classical boundary conditions. By no means does its possible time dependence support the
view that quantum states evolve.
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performed in spacelike relation but also realistic interpretations of the principle
of evolution.
In keeping with this principle, the wave function is widely regarded as the
primary affair, which the propagator 〈xf , tf |xi, ti〉 serves to propagate through
time a` la5
ψ(xf , tf ) =
∫
dxi 〈xf , tf |xi, ti〉ψ(xi, ti). (1)
This way of thinking makes it seem as if quantum-mechanical probabilities were
determined by a wave function or a quantum state, rather than by measure-
ment outcomes via computational devices called “wave functions” or “quantum
states.” If in addition one believes that quantum states exist and evolve in
the absence of measurements, and that measurements merely contribute to de-
termine them, then one treats quantum-mechanical probabilities as absolute
probabilities.
Conversely, the assumption that quantum-mechanical probabilities are ab-
solute, leads to (i) the spurious question of what it is that determines them
(over and above measurement outcomes) and (ii) the facile answer that they are
determined by a wave function or a quantum state that is not fully determined
by measurement outcomes. This in turn leads to (iii) the spurious question
about the nature of quantum states and (iv) the false dilemma that quantum
states are either states of nature or states of knowledge or belief. One horn
of this dilemma is the OPV, the other is the belief that quantum states exist
and evolve in the absence of measurements as prior probabilities in the beliefs
of agents. While this notion can make it easier to accept the idea that mea-
surements contribute to determine the evolving states of quantum systems, it is
nevertheless unwarranted, inasmuch as it involves the belief in the existence of
evolving quantum states.
To my mind, the laws of quantum mechanics encapsulate correlations be-
tween measurement outcomes—diachronic correlations between outcomes of
measurements performed on the same system at different times as well as syn-
chronic correlations between outcomes of measurements performed on different
systems in spacelike relation. We can use these correlations to assign proba-
bilities to possible measurement outcomes on the basis of actual measurement
outcomes, just as in a hypothetical classical world we can use the classical laws
to predict later states on the basis of earlier ones. Our use of the correlations
for the purpose of predicting probabilities may be considered subjective, but the
correlations themselves are as objective as the classical laws are in a classical
world.6
If the laws of quantum mechanics are correlation laws—correlating mea-
surement outcomes synchronically as well as diachronically—then quantum-
5In the case of a nonrelativistic system consisting of a fixed number n of particles, x stands
for a set of 3n coordinates.
6I am not saying that a mathematical construct like the Faraday tensor F is anything
more than a computational tool. I am only saying that F is a useful mathematical tool for
formulating an objective correlation law. The essential difference I see between the laws of
classical physics and those of quantum physics is the absence of principles limiting the accuracy
of predictions in classical physics as against the presence of such principles in quantum physics.
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mechanical probabilities are conditional rather than absolute. Conversely, if
quantum-mechanical probabilities are conditional, as has been stressed by Pri-
mas [17],7 then we have no need for an evolving quantum state, be it a state of
nature or a state of belief. In the following passage CFS appear to support this
conclusion:
Imagine a scientist who performs a sequence of Z measurements on
a qbit. Quantum mechanics, plus his experience and prior judgment
and perhaps the outcomes of a long sequence of previous measure-
ments, make him certain that the outcomes will all be “up.” Now
he performs the measurements, and he always gets the result “up.”
Shouldn’t the agent be surprised that he keeps getting the outcome
“up”? Doesn’t this mean that it is a fact, rather than a mere belief,
that the outcomes of his experiment will be “up”?. . . The answer
to the first question is easy: Surprised? To the contrary, he would
bet his life on it. Since the agent was certain that he would get
the outcome “up” every time, he is not going to be surprised when
that happens. Given his prior belief, only observing “down” would
surprise him, since he was certain this would not happen, though na-
ture might choose to surprise him anyway. The answer to the second
question is similarly straightforward. According to our assumption,
the agent has put together all his experience, prior beliefs, previous
measurement outcomes, his knowledge of physics and in particular
quantum theory, all to predict a run of “up” outcomes. Why would
he want any further explanation? What could be added to his belief
of certainty? He has consulted the world in every way he can to
reach this belief; the world offers no further stamp of approval for
his belief beyond all the factors that he has already considered.
In other words, we do not need a state of affairs that is external to the agent,
that depends on the first measurement outcome, and that is responsible for the
outcomes of the subsequent measurements. We do not need an evolving state
of affairs that mediates an influence of the first measurement outcome on the
subsequent measurement outcomes. In fact, if mediating states of affairs fail to
account for the synchronic correlations, how can we expect them to account for
the diachronic ones?
Instead of drawing the obvious conclusion that quantum states encapsulate
unmediated correlations between measurement outcomes, CFS do not challenge
the notions at the roots of the above dilemma. They accept the notion that
quantum states evolve, for how else could they assert that a pre-measurement
system-apparatus state arises from a “unitary interaction” between the system
and the apparatus? They accept that quantum-mechanical probabilities are
7Primas [17] has also drawn attention to an axiomatic alternative to Kolmogorov’s [18]
formulation of probability theory, due to Re´nyi [19, 20]. Whereas in Kolmogorov’s theory
absolute probabilities have primacy over conditional ones, Re´nyi’s theory is based entirely
on conditional probabilities. Primas states that every result of Kolmogorov’s theory has a
translation into Re´nyi’s.
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absolute rather than always conditional on measurement outcomes, for how
else could they assert that “facts alone never determine a quantum state”?
They merely deny the external, agent-independent existence of quantum states.
In other words, they merely internalize the evolving quantum states of their
opponents. Whereas for proponents of the OPV a quantum state exists in
advance of measurements as a state of nature, for CFS it exists in advance of
measurements in the form of a prior belief. “Any usage of probability theory
starts from a prior probability assignment” (original emphasis). And whereas
that state of nature is unknown, this prior belief can be neither verified nor
falsified. “The question of whether a prior probability assignment is true or
false cannot be answered.” The Bayesian internalization of quantum states may
relieve symptoms of the disease but it is far from being a cure.
4 How much can state assignments differ?
CFS go so far as to assert that for sufficiently divergent prior beliefs, “two
agents might even legitimately assign different pure states”.8 This brings up the
question of how much state assignments can legitimately differ. This question
has been addressed by Brun et al. [21], who showed that several density matrices
are mutually compatible if and only if the supports of all them have at least one
state in common, or equivalently, if and only if all of them have expansions of
the form
ρ =
∑
i
pi |vi〉〈vi|, pi > 0 (2)
with at least one state common to all expansions. It follows at once that two
pure-state density matrices are compatible if and only if they are identical.
Brun et al. define a set of density matrices to be compatible when there could
be circumstances under which they would represent the knowledge different
people have of one and the same physical system. Caves, Fuchs, and Schack [22],
who call the belief that an outcome is impossible a “firm belief,” have shown that
this definition of compatibility is equivalent to the existence of a density operator
that does not contradict the firm beliefs of any party. Hence if two agents can
“legitimately assign different pure states,” as CFS claim, such a density operator
does not exist. Any density operator then contradicts someone’s belief that an
outcome is impossible (i.e., it assigns a probability greater than 0 to at least
one outcome to which at least one party assigns probability 0).
5 An argument based on qbits
Carl Sagan, echoing Hume and Laplace, popularized the slogan that “extraor-
dinary claims require extraordinary proof.” The argument offered by CFS in
8Fuchs and Shack [35] write that “there is no fact of nature to prohibit two different
agents from using distinct pure states |ψ〉 and |φ〉 for a single quantum system.” Of course, if
quantum states are only beliefs, they can be mutually inconsistent, as beliefs often are—even
if they are held by the same person.
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support of their extraordinary claim that two agents can legitimately assign dif-
ferent pure states, however, is not likely to convince anyone who is not already
convinced of the conclusion. The argument begins by considering a quantum
circuit containing a system qbit initially in the state α|0〉+ β|1〉 and an “appa-
ratus” qbit initially in the state |0〉. A controlled NOT (c-not) gate produces
the entangled state α|00〉+β|11〉. A “measurement” of the apparatus qbit then
flips the system qbit if the outcome is 1, otherwise it does nothing. The system
qbit is thus prepared in the state |0〉.
CFS next consider a modified circuit in which the “measurement device” is
replaced by a second c-not gate. This likewise prepares the system qbit in the
state |0〉 but leaves the apparatus qbit in the state α|0〉+ β|1〉. If this modified
circuit is used but the initial state of the apparatus qbit is |1〉, the system qbit is
prepared in the state |1〉, and the apparatus qbit is left in the state α|1〉+ β|0〉.
The system qbit is thus prepared in the initial apparatus state, whatever that
state has been.
CFS insist on “the essential quantum nature of the preparation device”
(original emphasis). In conjuction with their Bayesian view of quantum states,
this “means that the prepared quantum state always depends on prior beliefs in
the guise of a quantum operation that describes the preparation device.” The
operation of a preparation device “always depends on prior beliefs about the
device, in particular, its initial quantum state.”
In actual fact, even if the operation of a preparation device did sometimes
depend on the initial state of the device, this won’t always be the case. If,
for instance, in the above example we simply exchange the roles of system and
apparatus, then the final apparatus state is identical to the initial system state,
whatever that state has been. Hence one might simply point out that the device
chosen by CFS is not a legitimate preparation device. A preparation device is
legitimate only if its initial state does not affect the state prepared and, as we
have just seen, such devices exist.
One might also object against the use of a two-state system as a measurement
device. How will one ever know whether a failure of the device to change its
state indicates an actual outcome or simply a failure of the device? (There is
no such thing as a 100% efficient device.) To get around this problem—and
to forestall qbit-based shenanigans such as the above—a measurement device is
usually expected to have a neutral state in addition to its outcome-indicating
states.
6 The preparation device: classical or quantum?
Another tenet of the view advocated by CFS is that the assumption that a
preparation device can be given a complete classical description “neglects that
any such device is quantum mechanical and thus cannot be specified completely
in terms of classical facts.” It may or may not be the case that a preparation
device can be given a completely classical description, but it is besides the point,
inasmuch as a device is a legitimate preparation device only if its quantum-
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mechanical nature is irrelevant to its functioning as a preparation device.
As an illustration, consider a particle of spin- 1
2
that has been prepared, with
the help of a Stern-Gerlach filter, in the state | + z〉. For a zero Hamiltonian
this means that a subsequent measurement of the particle’s spin component
with respect to the z′ axis, performed with a Stern-Gerlach splitter and two
detectors, will yield “up” or “down” with probabilities9 |〈+z′|+z〉|2 and |〈−z′|+
z〉|2, respectively. In order to say this, neither the preparation device nor the
measurement device needs to be given any but a classical description. The
essential piece of information is the angle between the respective directions of
two magnetic field gradients. All we need to know about the detectors is that a
response (“click”) indicates the arrival of a particle in its sensitive region. The
prior beliefs of agents nowhere enter the picture.
All that quantum mechanics allows us to calculate is correlations between
measurement outcomes. To be able to make predictions (or retrodictions, for
that matter), all we need and all we have is (i) these correlations and (ii) ac-
tual measurement outcomes. Think of density operators as machines with inputs
and outputs: insert a measurement M by specifying its possible outcomes, insert
the time of M, insert at least one relevant actual outcome of another measure-
ment, press compute—and out pop the probabilities of the possible outcomes
of M. The only possible description of a quantum system—at any rate, the
only one that enters into the calculation of probabilities and can therefore be
tested—consists of quantum-mechanical correlation laws and actual measure-
ment outcomes, the former given in mathematical language, the latter given
in classical terms. If there is anything more, it will involve hidden variables
and/or a cryptodeterminism of some kind. Speculations involving such things
invariably raise questions that they fail to answer—e.g., “Why are Bohmian tra-
jectories unobservable?”—even though there are straightforward answers—e.g.,
“because they don’t exist.”
Come to think of it, why is it that, according to CFS, the question of whether
a prior probability assignment is true or false, cannot be answered? The an-
swer is that without factual input, the quantum-mechanical correlation laws
are useless. If you press compute without inserting at least one measurement
outcome, the probabilities that pop out will evince an equal lack of information,
in keeping with the Principle of Indifference.
7 The limited reality of spatiotemporal
distinctions
The disease alluded to at the end of Sec. 3 is the notion that a time coordinate
serves to label objectively distinct simultaneities—infinitely thin slices of space-
time, if you like. In other words, it is the belief that physical events and states of
9If we take into account that no detector is 100% efficient, these probabilities are the
respective limits of nu/n and nd/n as n → ∞, where n is the total number of detector
“clicks” and nu and nd are the respective numbers of “up” and “down” clicks.
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affairs happen or obtain in an intrinsically and completely differentiated arena
called “spacetime.” The principle of evolution mentioned in that section is a
direct consequence of this belief, inasmuch as it underwrites the notion that
quantum states are evolving instantaneous states.
What if that intrinsically and completely differentiated arena is a figment
of our mathematical imagination? In this case spacetime coordinates only exist
as features of the quantum-mechanical correlation laws. While not objective
per se, they are (to a limited extent) capable of being objectified or becoming
objective via outcome-indicating events or states of affairs—the only points of
contact that exist between the correlation laws and the physical world. The
spatiotemporal aspects of the physical world then consist of the more or less
fuzzy relative positions and relative times that exist between physical objects,
physical events, and physical states of affairs. And these relative positions and
relative times exist to the extent that they are indicated by, or can be inferred
from physical objects, physical events, or physical states of affairs.10
If I am on the right track, then the spatiotemporal differentiation of reality
doesn’t go “all the way down.” To see this, remember that the exact localization
of a particle implies an infinite momentum dispersion and thus an infinite mean
energy. (In a relativistic world, the attempt to produce a strictly localized
particle instead results in the creation of particle-antiparticle pairs.) Therefore
no material object ever has a sharp position (relative to any other object). Now
let IR3(O) be the set of exact positions relative to some object O. We can
conceive of a partition of IR3(O) into finite regions that are so small that none
of them is the sensitive region of an actually existing detector.11 Hence we can
conceive of a partition of IR3(O) into sufficiently small but finite regions Rk of
which the following is true: there is no object Q and no region Rk such that
the proposition “Q is inside Rk” has a truth value. In other words, there is no
object Q and no region Rk such that Rk exists for Q. But a region of space that
does not exist for any material object, does not exist at all. The regions Rk—or,
what comes to the same, the distinctions we make between them—correspond
to nothing in the physical world. They exist solely in our heads. It follows that
the spatial differentiation of the physical world is incomplete—it doesn’t go all
the way down.
What holds for the world’s spatial differentiation also holds for its temporal
differentiation. The times at which observables possess values, like the values
themselves, must be indicated in order to exist or be possessed. Clocks are
needed not only to indicate time but also, and in the first place, to make times
available for attribution to indicated values. Since clocks indicate times by the
10This means, inter alia, that if physical objects, events, and states of affairs did not exist,
neither would the spacetime “arena.” The existence of the world’s spatiotemporal properties
stands or falls with the existence of objects, events, or states of affairs to which they can be
attributed.
11By a detector I mean an object with a sensitive regionR, capable of indicating the presence
in R of another object of a more or less specific type. An object A is capable of indicating
the possession of a property (by another object) or a value (by an observable) if this can be
inferred from a property—or a change in the properties—of A.
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positions of their hands,12 the world’s incomplete spatial differentiation implies
its incomplete temporal differentiation.
8 The macroworld
The possibility of obtaining evidence of the departure of an object O from its
classically predictable position13 calls for detectors whose position probability
distributions are narrower than O’s—detectors that can probe the region over
which O’s fuzzy position extends. For most objects with sufficiently sharp posi-
tions, such detectors do not exist. For the objects I have in mind, the probability
of obtaining evidence of departures from the classically predictable motion is
very low. Hence among these objects there will be many of which the following
is true: every one of their indicated positions is consistent with every prediction
that can be made on the basis of previously indicated properties and a classical
law of motion. These are the objects that deserve to be labeled macroscopic.
To permit a macroscopic object—e.g., the proverbial pointer needle—to indi-
cate the value of an observable, one exception has to be made: its position may
change unpredictably if and when it serves to indicate a property or a value.
We are now in position to define the macroworld unambiguously as the total-
ity of relative positions obtaining between macroscopic objects. Let’s shorten
this to “macroscopic positions.” By definition, macroscopic positions never
evince their fuzziness (in the only way they could, through departures from clas-
sically predicted values). This makes it legitimate to attribute to the macroworld—
not individually to each macroscopic position but to the macroworld in its
entirety, and not merely “for all practical purposes” but strictly—a reality
independent of anything external to it (such as the consciousness of an ob-
server [24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30]). But it also entails the supervenience of the
microscopic on the macroscopic.
In philosophy, supervenience is a relationship of dependence typically ob-
taining between sets of properties. According to one standard definition, a set
of properties A supervenes on a set of properties B if and only if any two objects
which share all properties in B must also share all properties in A. Beyond that,
the nature of this dependence (logical, nomological, or other) remains unspec-
ified. A typical example is the notion that psychological properties supervene
on physical properties (usually goings-on in a brain), which does not imply that
the former depend on the latter logically or nomologically. What I mean by the
supervenience of the microscopic on the macroscopic is that the properties of the
microworld depend in just this way on the properties of the macroworld—rather
than the other way round, as we are wont to think.14
12Digital clocks indicate times by transitions from one reading to another, without hands.
The uncertainty principle for energy and time, however, implies that such a transition cannot
occur at an exact time, except in the unphysical limit of infinite mean energy [23].
13A “classically predictable position” is a position that can be predicted on the basis of (i) a
classical law of motion and (ii) all relevant value-indicating events.
14We may now think of measurements as departures of macroscopic positions from their
classical law of motion, indicating goings-on in the microworld rather than being caused by
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9 Probability, objective fuzziness, and
the stability of matter
The Bayesian approach to quantum semantics is to take the Bayesian interpre-
tation of probability for granted and to see what light it throws on quantum
mechanics. To my mind, this puts the cart before the horse. As Appleby [31]
remarked, “[w]hereas the interpretation of quantum mechanics has only been
puzzling us for about 75 years, the interpretation of probability has been doing
so for more than 300 years.” Quantum mechanics, properly understood, may be
better equipped to throw light on the meaning of probability than probability
theory is equipped to throw light on the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
In any event, the Bayesian interpretation of probability appears to me to be
singularly ill-equipped for this task.
One only has to ask: what accounts for the stability of matter? Specifically,
what accounts for the existence of spatially extended objects
• that are composed of a large but finite number of unextended objects
(particles that do not “occupy” space),
• that “occupy” finite volumes of space, and
• that neither explode nor collapse the moment they are formed?
The existence of such objects hinges on the objective fuzziness of the relative
positions and relative momenta of their constituents.15 This, rather than our
subjective uncertainty about the values of these observables, is what “fluffs out”
matter.
The mathematical theory of probability relies on a primitive notion of prob-
ability to make contact with reality [32]. Instead of treating probability as a
primitive notion, we may regard possibility as primitive and look upon proba-
bility as a quantification of possibility. Any further interpretation ought to take
account of the context in which probabilities are assigned. The one-size-fits-all
approach fails to do justice to the disparate roles that probability plays in the
classical and quantum contexts.
One could take a further step, citing a close connection between possibility
and ignorance: as long as there is ignorance, there are alternative possibilities,
and as long as there are alternative possibilities, there is ignorance. But a
purely subjective interpretation of probability masks a fundamental difference
between the reasons for our ignorance. In a classical world, ignorance results
from a practical lack of access to existing facts or data (which could in principle
be used to retrodict the past as well as predict the future).16 In our quantum
them.
15By itself, the fuzziness of a relative momentum causes the corresponding relative position
to become more fuzzy. In a stable material object, this inherent tendency of relative positions
to become more fuzzy is counterbalanced by the electrostatic attraction between oppositely
charged particles, which causes relative positions to become less fuzzy.
16In a cryptodeterministic quantum world, ignorance would result from a theoretical or
in-principle lack of access to existing facts or data.
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world, ignorance results from the non-existence of facts or data sufficient to
predict the future or retrodict the past.
Why does quantum mechanics reduce us to predicting probabilities? I do not
believe that this question can be answered without reference to the constituents
of this world—which is what quantum Bayesians refuse to do. (Whatever the
constituents may turn out to be, they are not quantum-computational gates.)
The answer I suggest is that the fuzziness (or indefiniteness, or indetermi-
nacy) of all relative position and momenta is an objective feature of the physical
world.17 The question then is: how does one define and quantify a fuzzy observ-
able? And the answer is: by assigning probabilities to the possible outcomes of
a measurement. To be precise, the proper way to define and quantify a fuzzy
observable is to assign probabilities to the possible outcomes of unperformed
measurements.
Suppose we have measured an observable Q and obtained the outcome q. At
the time of the measurement, the value of Q is q. What can we say about the
value, at this time, of an observable Q′ that is incompatible with Q? We can
say that it is fuzzy. And how do we describe its fuzziness? We describe it by
assigning probabilities to the possible outcomes of an unperformed measurement
of Q′ on the basis of the actual outcome of the measurement of Q.
10 Objective probability
Contrary to the caveats of CFS, there are several good reasons for thinking of
quantum-mechanical probabilities as objective:18
• They are assigned on the basis of (i) objective, value-indicating events or
states of affairs and (ii) objective physical laws.
• They do not reduce to Bayesian degrees of belief. (As said, the stability
of atomic hydrogen rests on the objective fuzziness of its internal relative
position and momentum, not on anyone’s belief about the values of these
observables.)
• They play an essential role in the description of physics reality.
• In particular, they are needed to define and quantify the objective fuzziness
of observables.
I take this opportunity to address an argument against what Fuchs and Schack [35]
have called “the folly of trying to have two kinds of probabilities in quantum
mechanics”— one subjective and one objective.
17I used to consider it superfluous to stress that I am talking about a fuzziness in the
world rather than a fuzziness in the mind, but referees’s objections against my purported
use of “fuzzy logic” have taught me otherwise. As I have argued elsewhere [33, 34], most
interpretations of quantum mechanics suffer from a conceptual fuzziness that can be avoided
by taking the fuzziness out of the mind and placing it into the world.
18I agree, though, that there are also bad reasons, e.g., the statistical interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics, the frequentist interpretation of probability, or the propensity interpretation
of (quantum-mechanical) probability assignments.
14
The general state of a spin- 1
2
particle can be written in terms of the Pauli
matrices and the unit operator I as
ρ =
1
2
(I + S · σ), (3)
where |S| ≤ 1. If |S| < 1, there is an infinite number of decompositions of ρ
having the form
ρ =
∑
j
pj |nj〉〈nj | , (4)
where |nj | = 1 and {pj} is a probability distribution. Fuchs and Schack appear
to think that we are to regard the probabilities pj—which in one decomposition
may equal 3
4
and 1
4
, respectively, and in another may both equal 1
2
—“as sub-
jective expressions of ignorance about which eigenstate is the ‘true’ state of the
particle.” This is not correct. The probabilities pj are ignorance probabilities if
and only if a measurement with the possible outcomes |nj〉〈nj | has been made
but its outcome is not taken into account. In this case the decomposition of ρ
is uniquely determined by this measurement, and there is no ambiguity what-
ever about which probabilities are grounded in mere ignorance and which are
grounded in objective fuzziness.
On the other hand, if no measurement is made, then ρ itself is the “true”
state of the particle (that is, the most informative probability algorithm), so
the probabilities pj cannot be “subjective expressions of ignorance about which
eigenstate is the ‘true’ state of the particle.” The conclusion of Fuchs and
Schack—that “if a density operator is even partially a reflection of one’s state
of belief, the multiplicity of ensemble decompositions means that a pure state
must also be a state of belief”—thus falls apart.
11 In search of the ultimate constituent(s)
The conclusion of Sec. 8 was that the properties of the microworld supervene
on the properties of the macroworld. This means that we cannot think of
particles, atoms, and such as constituents of the macroworld. Then what is
it that constitutes the macroworld? And first of all, what does it mean to
constitute something?
We are in the habit of thinking that small things constitutes large things,
and that wholes are made up of distinct individual parts. Quantum mechanics
teaches us—at any rate, it ought to have taught us by now—that this kind
of bottom-up modeling has passed its expiry date. The conclusion of Sec. 7
was that if we imagine the world partitioned into smaller and smaller spatial
regions, there comes a point beyond which these regions, or the corresponding
distinctions, no longer correspond to anything in the actual world. By the same
token, if we keep dividing a material object, its so-called “constituents” lose
their individuality, as the following will show.
To begin with, if the properties of the microworld supervene on the proper-
ties of the macroworld, then what are the things we call “particles”? In the first
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place, they are correlations between “detector clicks”.19 Suppose that we per-
form a series of position measurements, and that every position measurement
yields exactly one outcome (i.e., each time exactly one detector clicks). Then we
have a conservation law, and we are entitled to infer the existence of an entity O
which persists through time, to think of the clicks given off by the detectors as
indicating the successive positions of this entity, to think of the behavior of the
detectors as position measurements, and to think of the detectors as detectors.
If each time exactly two detectors click, we are entitled to infer the exis-
tence of two persistent entities. Or are we? If there isn’t another conservation
law providing the entities with persistent identity tags, then the question of
which is which—Which of the particles detected at t1 is identical with which of
the particles detected at t2?—has no answer. In other words, the question is
meaningless.
Here as elsewhere, the challenge is to learn to think in ways that do not lead
to meaningless questions. What we have in this case is a single entity with the
property of being in two places whenever we check—not a system “made up” of
two things but one thing with the property of being in two places every time a
position measurement is performed. If we choose this way of thinking, then the
meaningless question “which is which?” can no longer be asked.
This conclusion can also be reached by other routes. Consider, for instance,
a particle that lacks internal relations. What is it “in itself,” out of relation
to its external relations? The answer is: nothing, except possibly a substance
without properties.20 The reason this is so is that the properties of particles
are either kinematical relations, such as positions or momenta, or parameters
characterizing dynamical relations, such as the various kinds of charge, or they
have objective significance independent of conventions only as dimensionless
ratios (e.g., mass ratios).21
But according to the philosophical principle known as “the identity of indis-
cernibles,” A and B are one and the same thing just in case there is no difference
between A and B. Not only is there no difference between two particles lacking
internal relations considered “in themselves,” but nothing corresponds to the
distinction we make between this particle and that particle over and above the
distinction between this property and that property. What follows from this
is the numerical identity of all particles lacking internal relations, when each
is considered by itself. If we think of particles lacking internal relations as the
“ultimate constituents of matter,” then there is a clear sense in which the actual
19This means, among many other things, that particles do not cause detector clicks. An
α-detector, for example, does not click because an α particle has entered its sensitive region.
Rather, the click of an α detector is the reason why an α particle is in the detector’s sensitive
region. [36, 37]
20Whereas a property is that in the world to which a logical or grammatical predicate can
refer, a substance is that in the world to which only a logical or grammatical subject can refer.
21Spin is both relational (inasmuch as its components are defined relative to a reference
frame) and characteristic of dynamical relations (inasmuch as it affects a particle’s momentum
probability distribution in the presence of an electric current). The use of “dynamical” is not
an endorsement of the notion of quantum state evolution but a reference to the dependence
of probabilities on the times of measurements.
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number of “ultimate constituents of matter” equals 1.
The bottom line: a quantum system is always one. The number of its so-
called “constituent” particles is just one of its measurable properties (which, in
a relativistic setting, can come out different every time we check). Hence if I
permit myself to think of the entire physical world as a quantum system and
to ask about its constituents, I find that it has just one—a single intrinsically
propertyless substance. In addition I am now in a position to account for the
origin of both matter and space: by entering into spatial relations with itself,
this single intrinsically propertyless substance gives rise to space, conceived of
as the totality of spatial relations, and it gives rise to matter, conceived of as the
corresponding apparent multitude of relata—“apparent” because the relations
are self -relations.
12 Understanding the supervenience of “micro”
on “macro”
The conclusions we have reached are supported by a time-honored ontology:
ultimately there exists a One Being, and the world is its manifestation. The
question, then, is: how does this One Being manifest the world, or manifest itself
as the world? And quantum mechanics suggests an answer. The “microworld”
is neither a world nor a part of any world but instead is instrumental in the
manifestation of the world (the macroworld, to be precise). Quantum mechanics
affords us a glimpse “behind” the manifested world at formless particles, non-
visualizable atoms, and partly visualizable molecules [34, 10], which, instead
of being the world’s constituent parts or structures, are instrumental in its
manifestation. But—and this is the punch line—we cannot describe what lies
“behind” the manifested world except in terms of the finished product—the
manifested world.22
But why cannot we describe the manifestation of the world except in terms
of the manifested world? The reason is that the spatial distinctions we make—
such as the distinction between inside R and outside R—are warranted only if,
and only to the extent that, they are physically realized (made real), for instance
by R’s being the sensitive region of a detector. To be able to say truthfully that
a particle is inside a region R, we need a detector, and this not merely in order
that the particle’s presence in R can be indicated but, in the first place, in order
that R be real and the property of being in R be available for attribution to the
particle.
Furthermore, in order that R be real, it must be definable in terms of macro-
scopic positions. By the same token, in order that the property of being in R be
attributable to the particle, it must be indicated by an unpredictable transition
in the value of an otherwise deterministically evolving macroscopic position—
that of the proverbial pointer needle. And in order that the property of being
22Perhaps Bohr himself didn’t realize how right he was when he insisted that, out of relation
to experimental arrangements, the properties of quantum systems are undefined. [38, 39]
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in R at the time t be attributable to the particle, t too must be indicated
by a macroscopic position. All of this is entailed by the identification of the
macroworld as the direct referent of “reality” or of “the (physical) world.”
13 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was twofold: (i) to offer a critique of the Bayesian
interpretation of quantum mechanics with particular focus on a paper by CFS
(which contains a critique of the “objective preparations view” or OPV), and
to carry the discussion beyond the hardened positions of the Bayesians and the
proponents of the OPV. Several claims made by CFS were rebutted, including
the claim that different pure states may legitimately be assigned to the same
system at the same time, and the claim that the quantum nature of a preparation
device cannot legitimately be ignored.
If a quantum state is more than a probability algorithm, it is not testably so.
It is therefore only prudent to view the time dependence of a quantum state as
a dependence on the time of the measurement to whose possible outcomes the
quantum state serves to assign probabilities. For both Bayesians and proponents
of the OPV, on the other hand, the time dependence of a quantum state is the
continuous dependence on time of an evolving state of some kind. This makes it
impossible to recognize the full implications of the one and only testable feature
of quantum mechanics—the probability distributions it yields. For, as shown,
continuous state evolution entails a completely differentiated time and therefore
a completely different spacetime, whereas an analysis of quantum-mechanical
probability distributions yields the opposite: the spatiotemporal differentiation
of the physical world does not go “all the way down.”
Why are measurements essential ingredients of all standard formulations of
quantum mechanics? While Bayesians keep the measurement problem safely
locked away in “a single black-boxed piece of hardware” [5], most others try
to gloss it over or explain it away. To be able to understand the special sta-
tus of measurements, one needs a clear distinction between what counts as
macroscopic and what does not. As shown, it is the incomplete spatiotemporal
differentiation of the physical world that makes this distinction possible. This
incomplete differentiation is entailed by an objective fuzziness, which is required
for the stability of matter, and which explains why the fundamental theoretical
framework of physics is a probability calculus.
Bohr was right: out of relation to measurements, the values of physical
observables are undefined. They are undefined because they supervene on value-
indicating events or states of affairs. What constitutes the macroworld is not
particles, atoms, or such but a Single Being, an Ultimate Reality, about which
we know nothing, except that it manifests the macroworld or manifests itself
as the macroworld. The microworld is neither a world nor a part of any world
but instead is instrumental in the manifestation of the macroworld. Quantum
mechanics affords us a glimpse “behind” the manifested world, at stages in the
process of manifestation, but it does not allow us to describe what lies “behind”
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the manifested world except in terms of the finished product—the manifested
world. This is the reason why the properties of the microworld supervene on
those of the macroworld. The reason why the manifestation of the world cannot
be described except in terms of the manifested world, is simply that without
the manifested world there is nothing in whose terms we could describe its
manifestation.
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